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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses one of the key issues – the foreseeability of the housing market 
downturn that began in September of 2007 and intensified in the fourth quarter of 2007 – 
that must be addressed in assessing the extensive securities class action litigation that has 
been filed against financial institutions (and others) seeking to recover damages for 
investor losses arising out of the credit market crisis. We begin our analysis of this issue 
by first discussing the legal centrality of this issue to much of this litigation. We then turn 
to answer the question of when the housing market downturn became foreseeable by 
analyzing housing prices (regional and nationwide), housing sales, housing future 
contracts, and various market spreads such as the ABX triple A indexes. We conclude 
that these data are consistent with the view that the housing market downturn was in fact 
not foreseen by the market prior to the fourth quarter of 2007.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that in many of the securities class action lawsuits that 
have been filed against financial institutions due to investors’ losses in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis plaintiffs will be able to point to statistically significant, substantial 
price drops associated with firm-specific disclosures of writedowns and losses associated 
with securities whose value has been negatively impacted, perhaps dramatically so, by 
the downturn in the real estate market.1 But the existence of such a statistically 
significant, substantial negative price reaction is hardly the end of the analysis necessary 
to assess the claim that investor losses attributable to this price reaction result in 
recoverable damages. There are still the questions of whether, and if so when, disclosure 
deficiencies by financial institutions occurred, whether the requisite scienter associated 
with these disclosure deficiencies existed, and whether investors’ losses are attributable 
to these disclosure deficiencies (this last issue being the requirement of loss causation in 
Rule 10b-5 causes of action).2  
The key unifying issue that must be addressed in answering these questions, and 
perhaps the most fundamental of all the issues raised in the current wave of securities 
class action litigation arising out of the financial crisis, is the extent to which the 
downturn in the housing market, and the resulting financial institutions’ writedowns and 
losses on securities with substantial real estate exposure, was foreseeable earlier in time. 
It is this foreseeability issue that our paper will focus on, including a detailed discussion 
of why this issue is legally central and our own analysis of housing data and market 
spread data that speaks to the foreseeability of the housing market downturn. We will 
focus on the foreseeability of the housing market downturn in our discussion and analysis 
beginning in 2006 as the vast majority of the class periods specified in the securities class 
action complaints filed against financial institutions begin in 2006 if not earlier.3 Indeed 
many of the securities class action complaints explicitly make the claim that the housing 
                                                 
1 This is of course, as is all our observations, a generalization. Our goal in this paper is not to address any 
particular case or set of facts but to canvass the general securities class action landscape. 
2 For a discussion of the loss causation requirement see Allen Ferrell and Atanu Saha, “The Loss Causation 
Requirement for Rule 10B-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo,” 63 
BUSINESS LAWYER 163 (2007) 
3 See Jennifer Bethel, Allen Ferrell and Gang Hu, “Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising Out of 
the Credit Market Crisis of 2000-2008,” forthcoming in Brookings. 
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market downturn clearly became foreseeable in the fourth quarter of 2006 and, at the very 
latest, in the first quarter of 2007.  
We will begin by briefly discussing in Part II the context in which much of the 
securities class action litigation against financial institutions is occurring. Specifically, 
much of the litigation is a response to the announced writedowns and losses that began in 
earnest in the fourth quarter of 2007 on securities, such as collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
with exposure to the real estate market and the substantial investor losses that were 
incurred starting in the fourth quarter of 2007. It is the conjunction of these announced 
writedowns with investor losses that leads us to conclude that in many cases it is likely 
there will be statistically significant, substantial price drops associated with announced 
writedowns and losses. 
Part III will then discuss in detail why the foreseeability of the housing market 
downturn is of great moment in assessing the legal soundness of many of the securities 
class action complaints. It is important to emphasize at the outset that when analyzing the 
foreseeability issue what is of primary legal importance is what the expectations of the 
market were concerning the likely future course of housing prices. That is to say, the fact 
that there were some observers that believed that housing prices might or would suffer a 
serious downturn does not by itself establish that the housing market downturn was 
foreseen by the market. There will always, after all, be observers who disagree with the 
market’s expectations, whatever those expectations happen to be. The market’s 
expectations of the likely future course of housing prices, as Part III will explain, will 
affect the analysis as to whether there was a disclosure deficiency that constituted 
actionable misconduct during the class period by a financial institution in the first place. 
The foreseeability of the housing market downturn will also affect, as Part III also 
explains, whether there was the requisite scienter (intentional or reckless misconduct) for 
any such disclosure deficiencies, and finally, even assuming misconduct with the 
requisite scienter, whether any of the losses suffered by the security holders of the 
financial institutions can satisfy the loss causation requirement.  
Part IV will then discuss the relevant academic literature. As we will discuss, a 
basic finding of this literature is that housing prices are the primary explanatory factor in 
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accounting for mortgage delinquencies and housing foreclosures, including the spike in 
delinquencies and foreclosures in 2007 and 2008. On a related note, several studies have 
found that the underwriting quality of mortgages are significantly less important as an 
explanatory factor for delinquencies and foreclosures, including the spike in 2007 and 
2008. Indeed, several studies document that along several dimensions, such as borrowers’ 
FICO scores, underwriting quality did not appear to deteriorate during the period leading 
up to the financial crisis. 
 Parts V and VI constitute the heart of our analysis. In these parts we turn to our 
own analysis of the foreseeability of the housing market downturn utilizing housing data 
in Part V and market spread data in Part VI. In terms of our housing data we first 
document that the substantial and sustained housing market downturn began in 
September of 2007 and intensified in the fourth quarter (October - December, 2007), 
rather than starting in the fourth quarter of 2006 or first quarter of 2007 despite common 
claims to the contrary. We document that this housing downturn was statistically quite 
unlikely if one estimates probabilities based on historical housing price data, the time 
series of which begins in January 1969. After discussing the housing price data, we then 
turn in Part V to an exploration of the variables that might explain the changes in monthly 
housing sales. We show that standard explanatory variables that have historically 
accounted for a substantial portion of the variation in changes in housing sales would 
have “predicted” positive housing sales during the September – November, 2007 period 
consistent with the view that the housing market downturn was unanticipated. We 
conclude Part V with presenting direct evidence of the market’s expectations about future 
housing prices based on the pricing of housing futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME). The CME housing futures market, it is worth emphasizing, is an 
institutional market in which the participants have their own money at stake. This 
evidence is consistent with the view that it was only at the end of 2007 and beginning of 
2008 (December of 2007 and January of 2008) that the market anticipated a serious 
downturn in housing prices.   
Part VI tackles the issue of the foreseeability of the housing market downturn 
from a different angle. In this part, we present data on various market spreads that 
impound information concerning market expectations as to the value of asset-backed 
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securities and, specifically, asset-backed securities with substantial exposure to the real 
estate market. And, as with the housing data, we once again argue that this data are 
consistent with the view that the housing market was in fact not foreseen prior to the 
fourth quarter of 2007. We document for instance that the market pricing of triple A 
asset-backed securities only experienced a substantial fall in value in the second half of 
October of 2007. This is of particular note as many of the securities that resulted in 
substantial writedowns and losses were triple A or better (so-called “super seniors”). 
Part VII concludes with some final comments. 
 
II. THE WRITEDOWNS AND INVESTOR LOSSES 
 
The fact that plaintiffs will likely be able to point, at least in many cases, to 
statistically significant, substantial price drops in reaction to a financial institution’s 
announcement of a sizeable writedown can be surmised from simply comparing the 
quarters during which substantial bank writedowns and losses associated with real estate 
exposure occurred with the stock performance of the S&P financial index, which consists 
of the financial firms in the S&P 500 index, for the same time period. Such a comparison 
can be done by simply looking at Figures 1 and 2.  
Figure 1 below presents the distribution of bank writedowns and losses associated 
with subprime mortgage exposure, an important source of real estate exposure, through 
the end of the second quarter of 2008 as well as the actual aggregate losses for various 
financial institutions for this period. 
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                    Figure 1 
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Figure 2 is a graph of the performance of the S&P financial index through the end of the 
second quarter of 2008. 
                  Figure 2 
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As is reflected in Figure 1, there were substantial bank writedowns and losses 
associated with subprime exposures to the housing market in the fourth quarter of 2007 
and the first quarter of 2008 (with the writedowns and losses in the second quarter of 
2007 being far smaller as a percentage of the total writedowns and losses and those prior 
to this quarter being de minimis). In terms of stock price performance, Figure 2 shows 
that for the two quarters with the bulk of the writedowns and losses (4Q, 2007; 1Q, 2008) 
financial institutions’ stock prices suffered with the most substantial price declines not 
occurring during this time period until the first quarter of 2008.   
 
III. THE CENTRAL LEGAL IMPORTANCE OF THE FORESEEABILITY ISSUE 
 
The issue of when the housing market downturn was foreseeable lies at the heart 
of many of the legal issues at stake in the current wave of securities class action litigation 
arising from the financial crisis. If the housing market downturn that began in earnest in 
the fourth quarter of 2007 was foreseeable then at least arguably many of the losses that 
financial institutions suffered, and hence arguably their security holders’ losses, were 
likewise foreseeable. These foreseeable investor losses, so the argument typically goes, 
supports, indeed substantiates, the claim that there were disclosure deficiencies by the 
financial institutions, the existence of the requisite (if the cause-of-action is Rule 10b-5) 
scienter for these disclosure deficiencies, and the existence of recoverable damages for 
investors.  
We will now discuss how plaintiffs attempt to establish disclosure deficiencies, 
scienter and recoverable damages by relying on the contention that housing market 
downturn was foreseeable during whatever the purported class period happens to be. In 
so characterizing plaintiffs’ claims and arguments we not do have any particular class 
action complaint in mind, but rather attempt to present what we view as a typical or 
common set of arguments. In presenting these sets of arguments and our subsequent 
discussion of them we focus purely on the housing foreseeability issue and will not 
address other important considerations that might affect the assessment of these 
arguments.4
                                                 
4 For instance, an important issue in assessing whether there was a disclosure deficiency is the “truth on the 
market” defense, i.e. the market already knew the truth that was supposedly concealed by the financial 
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A. Disclosure Deficiencies 
 
The claim that the housing market downturn that began in the fourth quarter of 
2007 was foreseeable during the purported class period is typically used in a variety of 
ways to support the argument that the financial institution in question is responsible for a 
disclosure deficiency that is actionable under the securities laws. We will now present the 
standard ways in which purported disclosure deficiencies work off of the contention that 
the housing market downturn was foreseeable. 
If the financial institution had substantial holdings of securities with exposure to 
the real estate market during the class period, a category that includes the vast majority of 
financial institutions named as defendants, then one of the primary disclosure deficiencies 
commonly asserted resides in the failure of the financial institution during the class 
period to fully disclose detailed information on the exact size of these security holdings 
as well as fully disclose the nature of these security holdings’ exposure to the real estate 
market, such as whether the exposure was to subprime, Alt-A or prime borrowers. 
Moreover, the purported failure of a financial institution to fully disclose off-balance 
sheet exposures to securities tied to the real estate market, such as the provision of asset 
backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) liquidity puts (contractual guarantees by a financial 
institution to purchase ABCP under certain conditions) is also often pointed to as 
constituting an actionable disclosure deficiency. Security positions, off-balance sheet 
exposures, and the nature of the resulting exposure to the real estate market all constitute 
materially important information, so the argument continues, given the foreseeability of 
the housing market downturn and hence the likely losses the financial institution faced as 
a result.  
The foreseeability of the housing market downturn is a crucial step in the 
argument for the existence of a disclosure deficiency as the mere fact that there was a 
statistically significant, substantial stock price drop associated with, say, a fourth quarter, 
2007 announcement of losses on CDO positions with real estate exposure does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
institution. For a discussion of this issue, see Jennifer Bethel, Allen Ferrell and Gang Hu, “Legal and 
Economic Issues in Litigation Arising Out of the Credit Market Crisis of 2000-2008,” forthcoming in 
Brookings. 
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establish that information concerning these CDO positions should be viewed as 
“material” information during the purported class period which would be an earlier point 
in time. If the market cares about the size and nature of a financial institution’s CDO 
positions in the fourth quarter of 2007 purely because of a downturn in the housing 
market at that time, or an expected downturn in the housing market at that time, then one 
would not expect information concerning the size and nature of a financial institution’s 
CDO positions to necessarily be of importance at a point in time when the market did not 
have these housing market concerns. It is worth noting that the potential non-materiality 
of this information during the purported class period remains even if there were some 
observers during the purported class period whose views differed from that of the 
market’s.   
Another standard argument for why financial firms who reported large 
writedowns and losses in the fourth quarter of 2007 and first quarter of 2008 are 
responsible for disclosure deficiencies, and hence are liable for investors’ losses, focuses 
on these firms’ public disclosures of the value of their security holdings during the 
purported class period, again a period which often begins in 2006 or earlier. Even if a 
financial institution did not separately publicly disclose the value of specific holdings of 
securities throughout the purported class period, such as the value of its CDO positions, it 
is still nevertheless possible that these valuations were included in the calculation of a 
more aggregated value of the firm’s security holdings that was released by the firm to the 
market during the purported class period. On a closely related note, a common claim is 
that larger reserves should have been taken in anticipation of future losses. Once again, 
the foreseeability of the housing market downturn will play a crucial role in the argument 
for why there was a disclosure deficiency as a result of these valuation disclosures or 
failure to establish sufficient reserves. If the downturn was foreseeable, and therefore so 
were the writedowns and losses on these security holdings and exposures that followed, 
then the alleged disclosure deficiency consists in the public disclosures of aggregate 
valuation figures that were improperly inflated as a result of a failure to incorporate the 
10 
 
looming housing market downturn or the misleadingly low levels of reserves set aside in 
anticipation of future losses.5
In buttressing these two disclosure deficiency theories, or sometimes as a basis for 
concluding that there was another separate disclosure deficiency, there is often an 
extensive discussion by plaintiffs of the deteriorating underwriting quality of mortgages 
during the purported class period as measured by the credit quality of borrowers, and 
documentation thereof, in relationship to the types of mortgages borrowers were 
assuming (such as mortgages with adjustable rates or interest-only mortgages). This 
discussion forms the basis for the claim that the overall quality of the pools of mortgages 
against which securities were being issued was deteriorating sharply over time and, 
hence, the risks, which were purportedly not adequately disclosed, to financial 
institutions with exposures to these mortgages, whether via CDOs, ABCP or MBS. As 
before, the contention that there was a foreseeable housing downturn typically plays an 
important role in the discussion concerning deteriorating underwriting quality as it is the 
interaction of a housing market downturn and poor underwriting quality that is claimed to 
have led to the substantial writedowns and losses suffered by financial institutions. The 
reliance on this interaction effect implicitly recognizes that in a world of appreciating 
housing prices but poor underwriting quality, financial institutions’ writedowns and 
losses would have been far less, perhaps largely non-existent, given the ability of the 
house itself to serve as a sufficient guarantee of payment.  
In the context of ERISA class action litigation, litigation which forms an 
important component of the overall securities class action litigation being pursued against 
financial institutions, the alleged disclosure deficiency claim often consists of the 
argument that the ERISA fiduciaries improperly failed to disclose that investing in the 
firm’s stock was an “imprudent” investment given the financial institution’s exposure to 
securities whose value is substantially tied to the value of the real estate market. As with 
the other disclosure deficiency theories already discuss, this argument again typically 
                                                 
5 Besides the foreseeability issue, there are other important issues that need to be taken into account in 
assessing this argument concerning valuation, including the appropriate accounting treatment used in 
generating publicly disclosed valuations (such as market-to-market versus market-to-model treatment in 
generating valuations). See, e.g., FASB 115 and 157. 
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hinges on the foreseeability of the housing market downturn given the need to establish 
that this exposure was risky or likely to generate losses (and hence “imprudent”). 
 
B. Scienter for Disclosure Deficiencies 
  
 A common, indeed standard, claim in the securities class action litigation is the 
contention that senior management at the financial institution in question recklessly 
accumulated positions or exposures to securities whose value was tied to the real estate 
market. The allegation of recklessness is often based on the further contention that senior 
management should have known or did in fact know that the value of these securities 
were likely going to fall, perhaps precipitously, given that it was foreseeable during the 
purported class period that the housing market was going to experience a serious 
downturn. These general statements concerning the predictability of future MBS, CDO 
and ABCP losses at a particular point in time due to the foreseeable downturn in the real 
estate market are sometimes calibrated to reflect the degree of subordination the security 
had (such as whether the security was in the super-senior, mezzanine or equity tranche) 
and the nature of the underlying exposure to the housing market (such as subprime, Alt-
A, or prime mortgages). In other words, there is the recognition that even adopting the 
position that the housing market downturn was foreseeable, the resulting losses on MBS, 
CDO and ABCP exposures will also be a function of additional factors. 
 
C. Damages for Disclosure Deficiencies 
 
An issue that has become of central importance, particularly in the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo6, is the 
necessity of establishing “loss causation” as a prerequisite for recovering damages in 
Rule 10b-5 actions. The “loss causation” is the requirement that the losses for which 
investors seek recovery must be traceable to the alleged disclosure deficiency. One 
formulation of the “loss causation” requirement is that losses must be attributable to the 
removal by a “corrective disclosure” of “inflation” that was present at the time of 
                                                 
6 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
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purchase. “Inflation,” in turn, is the difference between the actual price of the security 
and the price the security would have had but for the misconduct (the “but for world”), 
i.e. the price that would have obtained if the disclosure deficiency hadn’t occurred. And a 
“corrective disclosure,” as we have discussed at length in another article, is properly 
viewed as a disclosure that publicly reveals the firm’s earlier misconduct to the market.7 
In this connection it is worth noting that the Second Circuit in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co, Inc.8 indicated that if a risk was fraudulently concealed by a firm, then the realization 
of that risk can serve as a corrective disclosure if such a realization unveils to the market 
the earlier actionable misconduct. 
To establish loss causation it follows from the above discussion that it is 
insufficient to merely point to statistically significant, substantial price drops in reaction 
to a financial institution’s announcement of writedowns and losses. The mere fact that a 
firm has bad news, even terrible news, does render the announcement of such news a 
revelation of earlier misconduct. To conclude otherwise would be reminiscent of the 
questionable “true financial condition” theory of loss causation in which a disclosure that 
reveals information concerning the firm’s financial condition can be a corrective 
disclosure even if “no wrongdoing or error has been identified.”9 Not surprisingly, this 
theory of loss causation has been increasingly rejected by courts.10 As a result the crucial 
move, once again, is the contention that these writedowns and losses were somewhat 
predictable at an earlier point in time given the foreseeability of the housing market 
downturn thereby rendering the failure by the financial institution to publicly discuss at 
an earlier point these potential losses, or at least the risk of these potential losses, 
fraudulent. The revelation of the writedowns and losses, according to this logic, can then 
serve as a corrective disclosure given that it was precisely this type of information that 
should have been revealed earlier but was fraudulently concealed. 
                                                 
7 Allen Ferrell and Atanu Saha, “The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10B-5 Causes of Action: The 
Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo,” 63 BUSINESS LAWYER 163 (2007)  
8 396 F.3d 161. 
9 Madge Thorsen, Richard Kaplan and Scott Hakala, Recovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 
J.Bus. & Sec. L. 93, 102-103 (2006). 
10 See, e.g., Flowserve, 245 F.R.D at 574 (“The ‘true financial condition’ theory, if accepted, threatens to 
undermine the objective of securities law and disregards precedent”); In Re Retek, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, Civil No. 02-4209 (2009); cf. In re Omnicom Group, Inc., Sec. Litig., 541 F.Supp. 2d 546 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
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Moreover, even if there was a negative stock price reaction (after controlling for 
market and industry effects) to a “corrective disclosure” only that portion of the negative 
stock price reaction that is attributable to the removal of “inflation” that was present at 
time of purchase should be recoverable consistent with the “loss causation” requirement. 
A negative firm-specific stock price reaction reflecting damage to the company’s 
reputation, for instance, would not be attributable to the dissipation of “inflation” that 
was present at the time of investors’ purchases. “Inflation” at the time of purchase would 
not include future reputational harm caused by a corrective disclosure given that 
“inflation” is measured by reference to the “but for world,” the world in which the 
disclosure deficiency never occurred. In the “but for world” such reputational harm 
would not by definition have occurred. We labeled the non-recoverable portion of the 
negative stock price reaction in an earlier article “collateral damage.”11  
Besides the non-recoverability of “collateral damage” following from the standard 
definition of “inflation” there is a powerful economic reason to exclude such damages. 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores12, 
it is well established that “holder claims,” claims that include those filed by investors that 
purchased their shares prior to the actionable disclosure deficiency and held those shares 
through the corrective disclosure, cannot recover any damages. But holder investors 
suffer from “collateral damage,” such as harm to a company’s reputation, to the same 
extent as investors who purchased after the actionable disclosure deficiency and also held 
through the corrective disclosure. If the former set of investors cannot recover these 
damages, there is no reason to conclude that the latter set of investors should be able to.13 
In contrast, investors who did purchase after the disclosure deficiency did suffer a 
particular harm which holder investors were not subject to, i.e. purchasing at an inflated 
price and thereafter suffering from the dissipation of that inflation. Holder investors are 
differently situated with respect to this harm because they purchased at a price that was 
not inflated. 
 
                                                 
11 Allen Ferrell and Atanu Saha, “The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10B-5 Causes of Action: The 
Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo,” 63 BUSINESS LAWYER 163 (2007) 
12 421 U.S. 723 (1975) 
13 See Brad Cornell and Rutten, “Collateral Damage and Securities Litigation,” Working Paper, for a good 
discussion of the Blue Chips issue and the concept of collateral damage. 
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IV. RELEVANT ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 
 A number of academic studies document that housing prices are a primary 
determinant of mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures, including the spike in 
delinquencies and foreclosures experienced in 2007 and 2008. This basic finding further 
highlights the central importance of when the housing market downturn became 
foreseeable. Indeed, there is substantial evidence in the academic literature that the 
decline in housing prices was in fact substantially more important as an explanatory 
factor for the spike in delinquencies and foreclosures in 2007 and 2008 than poor 
underwriting quality.  
Perhaps the paper closest to ours is that of Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherland and Willen 
(2009) who examined whether market participants could have or should have anticipated 
the spike in foreclosures that occurred in 2007 and 2008.14 The paper finds that subprime 
mortgages originated in 2005-2006 were in fact not all that different from subprime 
mortgages made earlier. And these earlier vintages of subprime mortgages had in fact 
performed well. The paper also documents that the decline in housing prices was more 
important than other factors, including underwriter quality, in explaining the spike in 
foreclosures in 2007 and 2008.15 On the issue of underwriting quality, the paper further 
explains that, “One of our key findings is that most of the uncertainty stemmed from 
uncertainty about the evolution of house prices and not from uncertainty about the quality 
of the underwriting.”  
Finally, this paper found that market participants, such as analysts, during the 
2004 - 2006 period widely predicted continued housing price appreciation, albeit 
appreciation at a more modest pace. In terms of the academic literature during the 2004 -
2006 time period on whether housing prices were in some sense overvalued, there was no 
consensus with different papers taking different positions on the issue (and adopting 
different measures of what constitutes “over-valuation”).16  
                                                 
14 See Kristopher Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Shane Sherland and Paul Willen, “Making Sense of the 
Subprime Crisis,” forthcoming in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
15 See, e.g., id. at 17 (“[E]ven with the worst combination of underwriting characteristics, the predicted 
default rate is about half of the actual default rate experienced by this group of loans.”) 
16 See, e.g., Himmelberg, Mayer & Sinai, “Assessing high house prices,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
(2005) (justifying high housing prices on economic fundamentals); McCarthy and Peach, “Are Home 
Prices the Next ‘Bubble’,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review 10(3) (2004) (similar) with J. Gallin, “The 
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Mayer, Pence and Sherlund (2009) report “substantial evidence that declines in 
house prices are a key factor in the current problems facing the mortgage market.”17 This 
paper also reports a number of interesting findings on underwriting quality over the 2003 
- 2007 period. They found “little evidence that the rise in delinquencies through mid-
2008” was linked to “novel and complicated mortgages products.”18 An example of a 
novel and complicated mortgage product was “short-term hybrid” mortgages that often 
employed two- or three-year teaser rates. Moreover, they document that the median FICO 
credit score for mortgages in subprime and Alt-A mortgage pools remained quite stable 
over the 2003 – June, 2007 time period with the median FICO credit score for subprime 
mortgages being 615 in 2003 and 613 during the January – June, 2007 period. The 
median FICO credit score for Alt-A mortgages in 2003 was 710 and 707 during the 
January – June, 2007 period.19
The importance of housing prices in explaining mortgage delinquencies and 
foreclosures is reflected in other papers. Gerardi, Shapiro and Willen (2007) found, based 
on the default behavior of a large detailed sample of Massachusetts homeowners tracked 
over time, that housing prices were the primary drivers of defaults.20 Sherlund (2008) 
found, based on the default behavior of subprime mortgages that were securitized over 
the 2000-2007 period, that “[h]ousing price appreciation seems to be the primary 
determinant of default and prepayment behavior.”21
Consistent with the importance of the decline in housing prices in accounting for 
delinquencies and foreclosures are a series of academic studies that find that borrowers 
with negative equity in their home, i.e. the mortgage is larger than the value of the house, 
are more likely to default on their mortgage. These studies include those of Sherlund 
(2008) and Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008).22
                                                                                                                                                 
long-run relationship between house prices and income: Evidence from local housing markets,” 34 Real 
Estate Economics 417 (2006) 
17 C. Mayher, K. Pence and S. Sherlund, “The Rise in Mortgage Defaults,” 23 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 27 (2009). 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at Table 2, Panel C. 
20 Kristopher Gerardi, A. Shapiro, Paul Willen, “Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, homeownership 
experiences, and foreclosures,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper 07-15. 
21 S. Sherlund, “The Past, Present and Future of Subprime Mortgages,” Working Paper (2008). 
22 C. Foote, K. Gerardi, and P. Willen, “Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence,” 64 
Journal of Urban Economics 234 (2008). 
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V. ANALYSIS OF FORESEEABILITY: HOUSING DATA 
  
 We will begin our analysis of housing data by examining in Section A housing 
prices, both changes in monthly nationwide housing prices as well as monthly changes on 
a regional basis. This analysis will show that the sustained housing market downturn 
began in September of 2007 and continued throughout the fourth quarter of 2007. In 
contrast, the housing price declines in the fourth quarter of 2006 and January of 2007 
were more modest and quickly abated (as had happened in the past with nationwide 
housing downturns) until September of 2007.  
As a result, the issue is whether the housing market downturn that began in 
September of 2007 was foreseeable. We address this issue in a number of ways using 
housing data. In addition to examining the course of housing prices nationwide and 
regionally, Section A also calculates the likelihood of the September – December 2007 
housing downturn occurring based on historical housing pricing movements. Section B 
then addresses the probability of a housing market downturn occurring using historical 
housing sales data. Finally, Section C presents evidence of the market’s expectations of 
future housing prices based on the prices of housing price futures traded on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME). We view this evidence as particularly powerful as this 
constitutes direct evidence of what sophisticated market participants, with their own 
money at stake, believed about the future of housing prices. All three sets of analyses 
using various types of housing data are consistent with the housing market downturn that 
began in September of 2007 not being generally foreseen by the market.  
  
A. Housing Prices 
 
 1. Nationwide Housing Prices 
  Figure 3 below graphs the history of year-over-year changes in monthly nominal 
nationwide housing prices, beginning with January 1969 as this was the first month such 
data are available, and the statistical significance of these changes.23  
                                                 
23 Given that housing price data are available on a regional basis (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) we 
calculated a nationwide housing price series by weighting the regional data.  The regional weights were 
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              Figure 3 
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One basic fact, well-recognized in the academic literature on housing prices, is 
readily apparent from Figure 3. Prior to 2006, nationwide price declines were quite rare 
with such declines occurring with statistical significance in only five months (November 
and December 1990; July 1992; and January and February of 1993) with the trend 
quickly reversing itself after such declines. Indeed, even during the deep recession of 
1981-1982 housing prices did not fall nationwide. Rather, consistent with the 
observations of Case (2008)24 that the housing market has historically cleared through 
drops in housing sales (and starts) rather than reductions in price (a “quantity-clearing 
market”), the market cleared during the 1981-1982 recession, as Figure 5 will document, 
by a dramatic fall in housing sales.  
                                                                                                                                                 
calculated using optimal portfolio theory, which maximizes the mean-variance objective function. 
Statistical significance was calculated using the standard deviation of monthly year-over-year changes for 
the period January 1969 – December, 2005. 
24 K. Case, “The Central Role of House Prices in the Financial Crisis: How will the Market Clear?,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
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 The nominal year-over-year changes in monthly housing prices for the subperiod 
of January 2006 – September 2008 is reported in Figure 4 below. 
 
           Figure 4 
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Figure 4 documents that there were nationwide housing price declines during the four 
months of August, 2006 – November, 2006, with the very modest decline in December, 
2006 not being statistically significant, and a further decline in January of 2007. These 
declines were similar in magnitude to those that had occurred in the five months during 
the 1990s that also experienced statistically significant nationwide housing declines and 
which had quickly reversed themselves. The subsequent February, 2007 – August, 2007 
time period was essentially flat. Based on this reversal of the downward trend in prices, it 
would have been perfectly rational for financial institutions, during that point in time, to 
expect that the worst was over and a recovery in the housing market was on its way.  
Indeed such short-lived periods of price declines were the norm in the past forty years.  
As Figure 4 shows, the months of July and August 2007 did in fact experience positive 
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changes in prices, further bolstering the expectation of a recovery. However, we now 
know looking back in time, such expectations turned out to be untrue. 
Nationwide housing prices began to fall on a substantial and sustained basis in 
September of 2007 and continued unabated throughout the fourth quarter of 2007 (and 
beyond). It was these housing market declines, and specifically the housing price declines 
in the fourth quarter of 2007 (two out of these three months experienced declines in 
excess of 5%) that were simultaneous with the large writedowns and losses announced by 
financial institutions in the fourth quarter of 2007.  
 It is clear from Figure 4 that the statistical significance of the changes in monthly 
housing prices only became statistically significant on a sustained basis (with some price 
monthly declines exceeding 5%) starting in September of 2007 with housing price 
changes during the summer of 2007 not being statistically significant (and which where 
virtually flat in any event). 
 2. Regional Housing Prices 
 Turning to the regional data on year-over-year changes in monthly housing prices, 
we investigated the extent to which these regional housing price changes tend to be 
correlated. Table I documents that over the January, 1969 – December, 2006 period the 
incidence of all four regions (again defined as the Northeast, Midwest, South and West) 
simultaneously experiencing a drop in housing prices was exceedingly low at 0.4%. Even 
a synchronized housing drop among three of the four regions was quite rare with an 
incidence of just 2%. In contrast, as is documented in Table II, all four regions for 
September of 2007 as well as for all three months in the fourth quarter of 2007 (October, 
November and December) experienced a simultaneous drop in housing prices.    
Once again, this analysis is consistent with the view that the housing dowturn that 
began in September of 2007 was serious, sustained and, if one were to use historical 
housing data, unexpected.   
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B. Housing Sales 
 
 Figure 5 presents housing sales figures starting in January, 1969 till September of 
2008 along with the mean of the positive monthly housing sales and the mean of the 
negative housing sale figures during this period.  
      Figure 5 
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Consistent with Case’s (2008) observations, there has been in times of economic stress a 
substantial drop in housing sales. This is particularly noticeable in Figure 5 during the 
double dip recessions of the early 1980s (1980 and 1981-1982). There were also 
noticeable falls in housing sales in other times of economic stress, including the 
recessions of 1974-1975, 1990-1991 and the current time period.  
As can be seen in Figure 6, which focuses on the 2000-2008 sub-period, the 
decline in housing sales in the current time period substantially accelerated starting in 
September of 2007. In contrast, the decline in housing sales in the fourth quarter of 2006 
remained close to the historical mean of negative housing sales figures.    
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Figure 6 
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 Given the importance of changes in housing sales as the primary means by which 
the housing market has historically cleared in times of economic stress, we examined the 
relationship between year-over-year percentage changes in monthly housing sales (our 
dependent variable) over the January, 1969 – December, 2005 time period and, as 
independent variables, year-over-year percentage changes in: the U.S. unemployment 
rate, the production level of the purchasing managers’ index, the 10-year U.S. Treasury 
rate and, finally, whether the country was in recession.25 A description of these variables 
can be found in Table III and the regressions results in Table IV. We have then used the 
historical relationship of monthly housing sales with these independent variables as 
identified by our regression analysis to predict the housing sales changes for the ‘in-
sample’ period of 1969-2005 and for the ‘out-of-sample’ period of 2006-2008. 
The results of this analysis are reflected in Figure 7  
 
                                                 
25 We use an indicator variable that takes a value of one for each of the months identified by NBER as 
recessionary. 
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       Figure 7 
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 Figure 7 suggests that the key macro-economic variables do a fairly nice job (with 
an adjusted R² of 48%) of predicting the movements in the housing sales. However, these 
variables fail to predict the severe downturn in sales, particularly in the fall of 2007. The 
results presented in Table IV show that statistically significant deviation between model-
predicted sales changes (which are positive) and actual sales changes (which are 
negative) occurred for seven consecutive months between September 2007 and March 
2008. Thus, based on the historical relationship between the macro-economic variables 
and housing sales one would not have predicted the severe sales downturn in 2007.  
Again these results are consistent with the statistical significant declines in the housing 
prices we discussed earlier.   
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C. Housing Futures Data 
 
 Perhaps the most powerful evidence concerning what was in fact expected by 
market participants is pricing data on housing futures which were traded by large, 
sophisticated institutional investors on the CME. These were three-month forward 
looking contracts. It is bears emphasis that these investors stood to lose their own money 
if their prediction about future housing prices were incorrect and therefore had an 
incentive to accurately predict the future course of housing prices. Figure 8 plots the 
value of the CME housing futures contracts starting in August of 2006 when these 
contracts first traded.   
 
             Figure 8 
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It is readily apparent from Figure 8 that during the fourth quarter of 2006 and first 
quarter of 2007 market participants in the CME housing futures market did not anticipate 
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a decline in housing prices. Rather, what is observed is relative stability in market 
expectations until a decline in the fourth quarter of 2007 and then a precipitous drop at 
the very end of 2007 and beginning of 2008.  
 
VI. ANALYSIS OF FORESEEABILITY: MARKET SPREADS  
 
 A variety of spreads that track market conditions are consistent with the period 
prior to the summer of 2007, including the fourth quarter of 2006 and first quarter of 
2007, being largely devoid of general market turmoil. Many of these spreads indicate that 
the sharp deterioration in the markets first occurred during the summer of 2007 (and, 
importantly, for some spreads the initial sharp deterioration only occurring well into the 
fall of 2007). A number of these spreads also indicate that there was a partial recovery in 
September of 2007 with another sharp deterioration in market conditions occurring in 
November and December of 2007. To the extent that these various market spreads impact 
or reflect the market’s valuation of securities with substantial real estate exposure, these 
spreads can be useful, if analyzed appropriately, in assessing when the market began to 
anticipate the housing market downturn as an anticipated housing market downturn could 
well affect any such valuation (of course taking into account other factors, such as the 
level of subordination).  
One much commented upon market spread is the three-month TED spread which 
is a measure of the cost to large banks of borrowing funds from other banks on a short-
term, unsecured basis. More specifically, the three-month TED spread is the difference 
between the three-month London Interbank Offering Rate (which tracks the cost of funds 
in the unsecured London interbank lending market) and the three-month U.S. treasury bill 
rate (used as a proxy for the risk-free rate). The TED spread was largely flat from the 
beginning of 2006 (and indeed before then as well) till the summer of 2007. In June of 
2007, there was a relatively modest increase in the TED spread, a return to more normal 
levels in July, 2007, and then a dramatic spike in the spread occurring on August 9, 2007. 
The TED spread made a partial recovery in September of 2007 to more normal levels but 
again steadily and dramatically worsened in November and December of 2007. The 
general pattern is therefore one of market stability till August of 2007, partial recovery in 
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September of 2007, and then substantial deterioration in the fourth quarter (October – 
December, 2007).26   
One can see a broadly similar pattern if one looks at the difference between the 
yield on thirty-day A2/P2 commercial paper yield and thirty day AA-rated non-financial 
commercial paper. This spread is one measure for tracking the yield premium required by 
the market for purchasing low-rated (A2/P2) commercial paper relative to high-rated 
(AA) non-financial commercial paper. This spread, like the three-month TED spread, 
deteriorated sharply in August of 2007, staged a partial recovery in September of 2007 
and shortly thereafter experienced another sharp deterioration well into December of 
2007. The A2/P2 spread is depicted in Figure 9 below. 
 
              Figure 9 
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26 Other commentators have similarly characterized the sequence of events in the second half of 2007. See, 
e.g., Stephen Cecchetti, “Monetary Policy and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008”, Working Paper, p.15 
(“Starting in early August risk spreads abruptly widened. Then, through late September and early 
November, things looked as if they were calming down. At the end of November, as both the year end 
approached and it became clear that financial institutions were experiencing large losses, conditions 
worsened, and continued to deteriorate into the winter of 2008.”) 
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 If one were to examine the credit default swap spreads (which proxy for the risk 
of default on a firm’s debt against which the swaps are written) for the commercial and 
investment banks, one would once again observe a sharp increase in these spreads in 
August of 2007, a substantial narrowing of the spreads in September, and then another 
sharp increase in the second half of October of 2007 and continuing through the 
remainder of the year. 
A market spread of particular note are the values of various ABX indexes that are 
often pointed to as at least potential indicators of the value of MBS of various ratings 
(triple A and so forth) and vintages. Figure 10 below presents the value of various ABX 
indexes related to triple A rated MBS of different vintages. 
 
     Figure 10 
50.000
55.000
60.000
65.000
70.000
75.000
80.000
85.000
90.000
95.000
100.000
105.000
110.000
1/
25
/2
00
7
2/
15
/2
00
7
3/
8/
20
07
3/
29
/2
00
7
4/
19
/2
00
7
5/
10
/2
00
7
5/
31
/2
00
7
6/
21
/2
00
7
7/
12
/2
00
7
8/
2/
20
07
8/
23
/2
00
7
9/
13
/2
00
7
10
/4
/2
00
7
10
/2
5/
20
07
11
/1
5/
20
07
12
/6
/2
00
7
12
/2
7/
20
07
1/
17
/2
00
8
2/
7/
20
08
2/
28
/2
00
8
ABX.HE AAA Closing Prices since Jan 2007
2006-1 AAA 2006-2 AAA 2007-1 AAA 2007-2 AAA  
 
As is clear from Figure 10, the value of the ABX indexes associated with triple A 
MBS does not experience a sharp deterioration until the second half of October of 2007. 
While there was a relatively modest dip experienced in late July and August of 2007, 
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most of the lost value was recovered by September of 2007. This is of particular 
importance because many of the securities with substantial real estate exposure that 
resulted in the writedowns and losses announced by financial institutions beginning in the 
fourth quarter of 2007 were rated triple A (or were “super seniors” which were 
considered even better than mere triple A). The loss in value for many of the ABX 
indexes continued to decline at a rapid pace in January and February of 2008.  
 We conclude from our examination of these market spreads that there is little 
indication that the market was anticipating during the course of 2007 the serious housing 
market downturn that in fact occurred in the fourth quarter of that year. And, after the 
market disruptions experienced in August of 2007, there was an apparent stabilization of 
market conditions in September of 2007 with much of the serious downturn in many of 
these market spreads only resuming in the fourth quarter (and for the ABX triple A 
indices, only really beginning their initial serious fall in value in the fourth quarter).      
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 When the serious housing market downturn, which began in September of 2007 
and continued throughout the remained of 2007 (and beyond), was foreseen will be one 
of the centrally contested issues in the securities class action litigation that has been filed 
against a large swathe of financial institutions. The foreseeability of the housing market 
downturn plays a key role in the standard arguments by plaintiffs for why there were 
disclosure deficiencies, scienter for those disclosure deficiencies and loss causation for 
the sizable economic losses suffered by investors in financial institutions.  
 Based on our own analysis of housing price data, including housing prices, 
housing sales and housing futures prices as well as various market spreads, we conclude 
that the evidence is consistent with the proposition that the serious housing market 
downturn was not generally foreseeable and was not foreseen by sophisticated market 
participants prior to the fourth quarter of 2007. Indeed, market conditions were relatively 
benign till the summer of 2007 with partial normalization of conditions prevailing in until 
early fall of 2007 in the aftermath of the summer shocks. More specifically, we conclude 
that the evidence is consistent with the housing market downturn not generally being 
foreseen in the fourth quarter of 2006 or the first quarter of 2007.  
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       Table I 
 
Panel A: Frequency per Individual Region
Regions Frequency
Northeast 14.5%
Midwest 3.9%
South 6.6%
West 10.3%
Panel B: Frequency of Multiple Regions per Month
# of Regions 
with Negative 
Change Frequency
Same as Getting # of 
Heads in a Row in 
Coin Toss
0 75.9% -
1 15.8% 3
2 5.9% 5
3 2.0% 6
4 0.4% 8
Source: Housing prices used are Median Existing Single Family 
Home Prices retrieved from National Association of Realtors.
Observed Occurrence of Negative
 Year-Over-Year Housing Price Changes
January 1969 - December 2006
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                                                        Table II 
                                           Months with all 4 Regions  
                                              Illustrating Negative 
                                    Year-over-Year Housing Changes 
  _______________________ 
      Month Year 
   
1.   September 2006 
2.   November 2006 
3.   January 2007 
4.   September 2007 
5.   October 2007 
6.   November  2007 
7.   December 2007 
8.   April 2008 
9.   May  2008 
10. July  2008 
  11. August 2008 
  12. September 2008 
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Table III 
Description of Regression Analysis 
 
• Dependent Variable:
– Existing Single-Family Housing Sales for the U.S. (Year-over-Year % change) 
as published by the National Association of Realtors on the 25th day of each 
month 
• Independent Variables:
– U.S. Unemployment Rate (Year-over-Year % change) as published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics measures employment and unemployment (of those 
over 15 years of age) using two different labor force surveys conducted by the 
United States Census Bureau and/or the Bureau of Labor Statistics that gather 
employment statistics monthly. 
– Production level of Purchasing Managers' Index (Year-over-Year % change) as 
published by the Institute for Supply Management and is a monthly composite 
index of five sub-indicators (production level, new orders, supplier deliveries, 
inventories and employment level) based on surveys to more than 400 purchasing 
managers from around the U.S. 
– 10-Year US. Treasury Rate (Year-over-Year % change). 
– Months of Recession (dummy variable) as maintained by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and is a chronology of U.S. business cycles and identifies the 
dates of peaks and troughs that frame economic recession or expansion. 
 
• Regression Output: 
– Predict future Existing Single-Family Housing Sales based on the historical 
relationship between the above independent and dependent variables 
– In-sample period for regression analysis: January 1969 through December 2005 
(444 months). 
– Out-of-sample period for prediction: January 2006 through June 2008 (30 
months). 
– Comparison of actual Year-over-Year % change in housing sales to predicted 
Year-over-Year % change for the entire in- and out-of-sample periods (474 
months). 
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Table IV 
 
Panel A
Regression results
R Square 0.488
Adjusted R Square 0.483
Standard Error 0.102
Observations 444
Coefficients t Stat
Constant 0.059 10.686
Unemployment Rate -0.056 -1.751
Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) 0.291 12.340
10 year Treasury Bill -0.340 -10.595
Recession -0.073 -4.227
Panel B
Statistically significant and negative error months out of a total of 474 months
Count
Early 1980s May-80 Oct-80 Nov-80 Jan-81 Feb-81 May-81 6
Late 1980s Dec-87 Apr-89 May-89 Jun-89 4
Early 1990s Aug-91 Oct-91 May-92 Apr-95 4
Late 2000s Jun-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 8
Total 22
Notes:
[1]  Error is defined as the difference between the actual sales percent change and the predicted sales percent change.
[2]  Statistically significant error is defined as months where the error divided by the standard error of regression is less than -1.96.
Regression Results and Significant Negative Error Months
Months
 
